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The division of a cake by two players is modelled by means of
a silent game oí timing. It is shown that this game has a unique
Nash equilibrium. The strategies of the Nash equilibrium are explic-
itly given.
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11 Introduction
We consider the situation that two players divide a cake of size 1. At time
0 player 1 has the initial right to receive the amount al ~ 0 and player 2
has the initial right to receive the amount az ~ 0. Here, it is assumed that
al f a2 C 1. Player i must choose a point in time t; E [0, oo) to claim his
piece of the cake. If tl G t~, then player 1 gets the discounted part albt~ of
the cake, while player 2 receives the discounted remaining part ( 1 - a~)bf~,
with 0 G b c 1. 50, in particular, we assume that both players have identical
discount factors. For tl 1 tZ the cake is divided in an analogous way and if
tl - t~, then each player receives his discounted initial right and they share
the remaining part equally.
Note that the above described procedure results in a non-zero sum silent
duel, which is a special case of a game of timing first analysed by Karlin
(1959) in the zero sum context. In a silent duel both participants can not
observe the execution of the action of their opponent. Noisy duels, in which a
player observes the action of his opponent at the moment of their execution,
were investigated e.g. in Hendricks, Weiss and Wilson ( 1988).
Further it can be noted that the above model does not fit within the
extensive literature on bargaining models like in Rubinstein ( 1982). In these
models the strategies of the players are a combination of proposals and re-
actions on proposals. This is not the case here, the players simultaneously
choose a time point at which they want to get their part of the cake.
The main result of this paper is that the non-cooperative silent game of
timing as described above has a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.
The strategies of this equilibrium are explicitly given and it is found that the
corresponding equilibrium payofl's do not depend on the discount factor b.
2 The model
Consider a cake of size 1. Let al ~ 0 and a2 ~ 0, al f a2 G 1, be the initial
right of player 1 and pla}~er 2 and let b E(0, 1) be the common discount
factor. VVith player i choosing a point in time t; E[0, oo) to claim his piece
of cake, the payoff of player 1 is defined by
2alóh
~i(ti, tz) - {~i f z(1 - a, - az)}ói~
(1 - az)ó`~
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Figure 1 Payoffs if fl G tz Figure 2 Payoffs if t~ - t~
A mixed strategy of player i is a probability measure P; on (0, oo). Let F;
be the corresponding distribution function defined by F;(x) - P;{(-oo,x]}.
Note that F; is right continuous and limsy~ F;(x) - I. We will use both
P; and F; to denote a mixed strategy of player i. The probability in a
point we denote for convienence by q;(x) - F;(x) - F;(x-), where F;(x-) -
P;{(-oo, x)}. The Lebesgue-Stieltjes integral is used to calculate the payoff
of the players if both players play a mixed strategy.
The above described silent game of timing will be shortly denoted by I'.
3 The Nash equilibrium
In this section we show that the game I' introduced in section 2 has a unique
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.
3It is not difficult to see that there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Suppose (tl,tz) is a Nash equilibrium. If tl G tz (tz C tl)then player 2(1)
has an incentive to claim his part of the cake earlier then he did but still
later then player 1(2). If t~ - tz then each player has the incentive to make
his claim a fraction later. Hence a Nash equilibrium in the game of timing,
if it exists, will be one in mixed strategies.
In the following we assume that (Fl, Fz) is a Nash equilibrium with payoff
(ql, riz). Note that each player i can guarantee himself at least a; by playing
the pure strategy t; - 0. This implies that rt; ~ a;.
We first introduce two functions that will play an important role. The func-
tions gm :[0, oo) -. [0, oo) and g2' :[0, oo) -~ (0, oo) are defined by
~
m(t) - gz - ~2
9i
and
for all t E[0, oo) (1)
(1 - al - az)bt
t
g~' (t) - ( I ~ia ~'~ )b~ for all t E [fi, ~) (~)
i- z
A relation between these functions and the equilibrium strategies (Fl, Fz)
is given in the following argument. The definition of a Nash equilibrium
implies that for all t E[0, oo), rtl 1 ~rl(t, Fz) and ~z 1 rrz(Fl, t).
The payoff of player 1 playing t when player 2 plays F2 is given by
~~(t, Fz) - c~,b`(1 - Fz(t)) ~ (1 - c~z)ó`Fz(t-)
fbt{cYi -~ 2(1 - ai - az)}(Fz(t) - Fz(t-))
- ót{ai f(1 - ai - az)Fz(t)} - bt2(1 - ai - az)4z(t) (3)
Analogously we find for player 2 playing t when player 1 plays Ft that
az(Fl,t) - b`{az f ( 1 - a~ - az) Fi(t)} - bt2(I - al - az)4i(t) (4)
By the equilibrium condition and the-right-continuity of F; we obtain the
following inequalities
4Fl C gm and F2 G gz' (5)
In the following lemma we show that Fl and F2 do not have a masspoint at
the same time moment. The argument is similar to the non-existence of a
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Lemma 1 If (Fl, F2) is a Nash equilibrium oj I' then ql(t).q2(t) - 0 for all
t E (0, oo) .
PROOF: Suppose that both ql(t) ~ 0 and Q2(t) 1 0.
Since ql(t) 1 0 we have that ~1(t,F2) - a~(F1iF2).
Since q2(t) 1 0 and FZ is a right continuous and monotone there exists an
e 1 0(small enough) such that both Qz(t f e) - 0 and ~rl (t, Fz) G ~rl (t ~ e, Fz)
(cf (3)). This contradicts the fact that (Fl, Fz) is a Nash equilibrium of I'.
O
The payoffvector (pl, q2) of the Nash equilibrium (Fl, F~) satisfies the fol-
lowing conditions:
rliGl-qZCl-a2 and qZGl-n1G1-~1
Hence, there exists a time moment c in which the piece of cake that player
2 will leave is equal to the equilibrium payoff that player 1 receives, i.e.
c E[0, oo) such that ê`(1 - a2) - rll. Analogously we can define d E [0, oo)
such that ód(1 - al) - qz. Lemma 2 shows that c and d coincide and that
both equilibrium strategies put no probability on the interval (c, oo).
Lemma 2 Let (Fl, F2) be a Nash equilibrium of I' with payoff vector (ql, rl2)
and let c, d E [0, oo) such that b`(1 - a~) - rtl and bd(1 - al) - q2. Then
c-inf{x~Fl(x)-1}-inf{x~FZ(x)-1}-d.
PROOF: First we show that Fl(c) - 1.
Suppose 1- Fl(c) ) 0. In the following calculation the first equality is
obtained by integrating (3) and lemma 1, the first inequality by using the
fact F2 G g2' (cf (5)), the second inequality holds since F2(x) G 1 for all
x E [0, oo) and the strict inequality since br(1 - a2) is a strictly decreasing
function in x and 1- Fl(c) ) 0.
5ni(Fi, Fz)
- fo ~~
br{a, -~ (1 - a, - az)Fz(x)}dP,(x)
- bz{a, ~ (1 - a, - az)Fz(x)}dP,(x)
[o,~l
f f 6r{a, ~(1 - a, - az)Fz(x)}dP,(x)
(~,~)
C y,F,(c) ~- f b2{a, f( 1 - a, - az)Fz(x)}dP,(x)
(~,~)
C rI1Fi(c) -~ ,f b~(1 - az)dPl(x)
t~.~)
c r)1Fi(c) ~ f rl~dP~(x) - rli
(~,~)
Contradiction. Analogously one can show that Fz(d) - 1.
Let c' - inf{x ~ F,(x) - 1} and d' - inf{x ~ Fz(x) - 1}. Then c' C c
andd'Cd. -
Suppose c' C d'. Then for all x E(c', d'), (3) and the definition of d imply
that
~z(Fi,x) - bZ(1 - a,) 1 bd(1 - a,) - ~lz (6)
Contradition since (F,, Fz) is a Nash equilibrium.
Hence, we may conclude that c' - d'.




Lemma 2 immediately implies
Corollary 1 If (F,, Fz) is a íVash equilibrium of I' with payoff vector ( q,, qz),
then
rl, 1 - az
~Iz - 1 - a,
6The following lemma shows that on the interval [0, c] the equilibrium strategy
Fl coincides with the function gm as defined in (1). Here one should note
that, since gi2 is strictly increasing, gm(0) ~ 0 and g~'(c) - 1, g~ is a
distribution function on [0, c]. Similary, we can find that F2(x) - g2' (a) for
all x E [0, c].
Lemma 3 Let (Fl, F~) be a Nash equilibrium of I' with corresponding pay-
offvector (q1i rt2). Then for all x E [0, c] it holds that
Fi(x) - 9i'(x) and F2(x) - 9~'(x)
PROOF:
It suffiices to prove the first equality.
(i) First we show that P2({x ~ Fl(a) C gm(x)}) - 0.
Integration of (4) with respect to P2 and using lemma 1 and lemma 2 gives
~2 - ~2(Fl, F2) - f br{aZ -~ (1 - al - az)Fl(x)}dP2(x)
(o,~]
and by straightforward calculation
bz{az f (1 - al - a2)gi"j(x)}dP2(x) - riz
[o,~]
From (7) and (8) it follows that




Since (5) gives that Fi(x) C gi'(x) for all x E [0, c] the proof is completed.
Analogously one can show that Pl({x ~ F2(x) G g~'(x)}) - 0.
(ii) Secondly we prove that Fl is continuous on (0, c].
5uppose Fl is not continuous on (0, c]. Then there exists a z E(0, c] such
that ql(z) - e~ 0. Since gi' is continuous on [0, c], there exists a b~ 0 such
that dx E(z - b, z] it holds that
9i~(z) - 9i~(x) G e
Then for all x E (z - b, z) we have
7F1(x) c Ft(z-) - F1(z) - 91(z) - F,(z) - e
C gi'(z) - e G gm(x)
Hence, part (i) implies that P2({(z-b, z)}) - 0. So F2 is constant on (z-b, z).
Since ql(z) ~ 0 Lemma 1 implies that q~(z) - 0. Hence, F~ is constant on
(z - b, z] and, since g2' is strictly increasing, we find that F2(z) G g2' (z).
However, using ( i) this should imply that ql(z) - Pl({z}) - 0.
From (i) and (ii) it follows that Fl(x) - gm(x) for all x E (O,c]. ~
Until now we only have shown some properties a possible Nash equilib-
rium of the game I' does satisfy. The following theorem gives the strategies
of the unique Nash equilibrium and its payoff.
Theorem 1 The game I' has a unique Nash equilibrium (Fi , F2) in mixed
strategies, given 6y




9~'(x) if 0 C x G c
1 if x)c
with c such that gi2 (c) - g2' (c) - 1. The equilibrium payoff is (qi, rt2) where
qi - a' 1-a' and qz - a2 in case a~ C az i-a,
and
7~i - al and 7~2 - a' 1-a' in case al 1 aZ
1-az
PROOF: We only consider the case al C a~.
Clearly ~1(Fi, F2 ) - rli and ~2(Fi, F~) - r12.
First we show that (Fi, F2) is a Nash equilibrium.
Let Gl be a mixed strategy of player 1. Then
~i(Gi, Fs ) C J[o,~~
bs{al f(1 - al - a~)Fi(x)}dG~ (x)
- J[o~JrlidG1(x) f ~c~l bx(1 - aZ)dGl(x)
8~ ~1 - ~1(Fl ~ F2 )
The first inequality follows by (3), the equality by substitution of F2. The
last inequality follows since for x E(c, oo) it holds that ór(1 -~2) C Oi.
Analogously it can be shown that ~rz(Fi, FZ )~ ~rz(F~ , G2) for all mixed
strategies G2 of player 2. -
Secondly we show uniqueness.
From lemma 3 it follows that if I' has a Nash equilibrium (Fl, Fz) with payoff
(gl, rI2) then (Fl, FZ) is the unique Nash equilibrium with payoff (r~l, r~2). Sup-
pose there exists a Nash equilibrium (Fl, Fz) with a payoff (r~l,r~z) ~(gi~ r)z)-
Since g~ ~~2i corollary 1 implies that nl -~r~Z ~ i-á?a~ - r~i. Simi-
larly one can show that ~~ 1 r~~. Using corollary 1 again gives m-~ and
hence r~l ~ gi and ~2 ~ r~2. This yields that r~; ~ a;. This implies that
gi'(0) 1 0 and g2'(0) 1 0(cf (1) and (2)). However, from lemma 3 follows
that F~(0) - gi'(0) and F2(0) - gz'(0). This contradicts with lemma 1. ~
Note that the the payoff of the unique Nash equilibrium is independent of the
discount factor b. In fact, one could say that ó only influences the duration
of the game. If b becomes larger the players will become more patient, i.e.
the interval [0, c] will become larger.
We conclude this paper with three additional remarks with respect to some
slight changes of the model.
In this paper we studied the case that when the pure strategies of both
players coincide each player obtains his discounted initial right while the re-
maining part is split equally. In stead of a half-half division of the remainder
in case of a tie one could divide the remaining part in any other fixed propor-
tion to the players, i.e. if both players claim on time t the payoff of player 1 is
bt(al fp(1- al -~2) ) and the payoff of player 2 is b`(~2 ~(1- p)(1- cel -~2 ))
with p E[0, 1]. This modification does not affect the results of this paper.
Moreover, the expressions stated in theorem 1 will be independent of the
parameter p.
Secondly we can consider the case when the initial rights of the players
constitute a division of the whole cake, i.e. ~1 f~Z - 1. Then obviously
each player will claim his initial right at time t- 0. Hence, in this case the
strategy (0, 0) is the unique Nash equilibrium with payoff (al, cr2).
9Finally, in case there is no discounting, i.e. b- 1, it will be obvious that
there is no Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.
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